Secular Atmospheres: Unveiling and Urban Space in Early 20th Century Iran

Chavoshian, Sana

Secular Atmospheres: Unveiling and Urban Space in Early 20th Century Iran

Sana Chavoshian *

Abstract: *»Säkulare Atmosphäre: ‚Entschleierung' und urbaner Raum im Iran des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts«*. Drawing on sociological approaches to urbanism and secularization, as well as the affective turn in anthropology, this article explores the implementation of secular policies in Iran after the 1936 Unveiling Decree. I argue that constructing transparent social relations reflects the emergence of a new level of secular binds and relies upon the modalities of urban infrastructure and architecture. I find that modernization and secularization in Iran are interlinked by transformations in urban planning that tended to eliminate sites of ambiguity and to homogenize structures and forms of interaction in public and domestic spaces. The article makes use of autobiographical narratives that give witness to manifest changes in the urban atmosphere between the 1930s and 1950s. I will show how the Pahlavi regime took an active role in attempting to build a secular city by invoking segmentations and divisions in urban spaces to promote a secular atmosphere and limit religious ideas.

Keywords: Secularity, affect, unveiling decree, atmosphere, architecture.

1. Introduction

On January 7, 1936, Tehran's Teacher Training College held its graduation ceremony in the presence of Reza Shah, the first Pahlavi king, and his queen and princesses who were wearing Western-style clothes. All women at the ceremony were required to attend 'unveiled.' The presence of the king and his family on that day, which would later be celebrated as "Women's Liberation Day,"[1] was part of a plan by Reza Shah and his minister of education to accel-

* Sana Chavoshian, The Humanities Centre for Advanced Studies "Multiple Secularities - Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities" Nikolaistraße 8-10, 04109 Leipzig, Germany; sana.chavoshian@uni-leipzig.de.

I would like to thank Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, Marian Burchardt, and Markus Dressler for their helpful comments and critiques.

[1] On this occasion, Reza Shah made the following speech: "I am excitingly pleased to observe that as a result of knowledge and learning, women have come alive to their condition, rights and privileges... You should avail yourselves of the opportunities which you have now to improve the country" (Mahdavi 2003, 185). According to Hikmat, on the same day he met with his cabinet and announced: "Today the Iranian nation joined the ranks of civilized countries. Europeans always criticized and scolded us because of the women's hijab, their

erate and reinforce the unofficial 'unveiling program' (Rostam-Kolayi and Matin-Asgari 2014, 133). Less than three weeks prior to the ceremony, in December 1935, a decree had been announced requiring women to be unveiled. This unofficial decree was immediately enforced throughout Iran and also widely protested (Ahmadzadeh 2016, 14).

The first protests were by men and women in religious cities such as Qom, and especially among clerics. Besides their opposition to the unveiling of women, the clerics opposed the state's intervention in the structure of Islamic seminaries as the Unveiling Decree also introduced restrictive rules regarding the use of the turban.

In 1936, the topic of 'unveiling' was well known to the clerics and the public. Since the Constitutional Revolution in 1906, it had been a central political question framed as the "women's question"[2] and had been discussed in women's associations. The associations had agreed not to make women's attire one of their political priorities as they anticipated that this would provoke the anger of conservatives, including many clerics, resulting in further restrictions being placed on women.[3] By the time of the decree, the diverse women's associations had polarized into those supporting and those opposing the regime.

Police and municipal officials enforced the Unveiling Decree and implemented a more extreme version thereof. Officials attacked veiled women in the streets, tore their chadors and forcibly removed their veils (Hikmat 1975, 88). In the years between 1936 and 1942, voluntary female associations and their journals were dissolved. The state encouraged intellectual circles to include female family members in their gatherings and improved education conditions for women, increasing the number of schools and materials for them. At the same time, the Unveiling Decree was enforced in an increasing number of spaces, reaching everywhere except within women's homes. The changes that resulted from the Unveiling Decree were facilitated by a reconfiguration of secular and religious spaces. This involved the segmentation of urban spaces into spaces of surveillance and private spaces free of surveillance.

This article has two aims. First, it aims to investigate the spatial arrangements and modes of urban design at the time of the implementation of the Unveiling Decree, e.g., the city gates, electric street lamps, and the parallel, widened alleys. Second, it aims to shed light on sensibilities related to architec-

---

ignorance and illiteracy. Thank God we have overcome this defect too, rendering the country yet another service" (Hikmat 1975, 97-8. In Rostam-Kolayi and Matin-Asgari 2014, 133). See also Chehabi (2003).

[2] On the role of women and their campaigns during the Constitutional Revolution, see Paidar (1995); Afary (2009); Rostam-Kolayi (2003, 157-80); Ettehadieh, (2004, 86); Kashani-Sabet (2011, 147-67) and Najmabadi (2008, 39-57).

[3] In his autobiography, Yahya Dowlatabadi describes how he and female family members worked within associations until the 1930s to support unveiling (1952, 420-1; 424-30).

ture and domestic spheres, which have been largely neglected in research on secularity.

The changes implemented in the wake of the Unveiling Decree illustrate that the aesthetics of modern Iranian nation-building were similar to those in Turkey, Afghanistan, and central Asia during the same period. The existing literature attests to parallel changes in these countries and focuses on the necessity of "nation-building" and its ties to the making of the "public sphere" (Cinar 2005, Sadeghi 2013). The new states drew "both material and metaphorical boundaries" to define legitimate lifestyles and national identities in gendered and religious terms (Cinar 2005, 34). In this article, however, I deliberately take a different direction, focusing on the spatial aspects of secularity in terms of building and promoting *transparent social relations.* Discourse on the 'legitimate lifestyle' was not only shaped by ideas of 'nation-building.' It was also influenced by the modernization of urban infrastructure, planning, and architecture. Rather than looking at how the state defined the 'legitimate lifestyle,' this article explores how boundary drawing was configured around multiple sites of micro-power in urban space and how women and their religious sentiments came to play a fundamental role in the constitution of new spatial and emotional arrangements of society creating an affect-guided divide in social life.

Focusing on affect and secularity, I begin by examining how the state distinguished the religious from the secular by means of the 1936 Unveiling Decree (*kashf-i hijab*). I then consider how state practices gave these distinctions a material form. In doing so, I aim to show that the turn to a secular urban atmosphere, and veiled women's local resistance to being pushed out of public spaces, involved new representations of identities, fields of action, and spatial arrangements: in the streets, houses, and the architecture of cities like Isfahan and Tehran.

2. Secularism, Veiling and the Affective Dimension of Urban Space: The Missing Link

Gender has become a central concern in recent studies on secularism in non-Western contexts (Göle 1996, Najmabadi 2007, Kashani-Sabet 2011, Sadeghi 2013). As Nilüfer Göle argues in the context of Kemalist Turkey, reading history while ignoring the agency of women, who were a part of it, serves to highlight solely the passively "given" and not actively "taken" nature of women's rights and secular demands in public (1996, 144). These studies illustrate the active role played by women prior to the Unveiling Decree in political parties, women's associations, and journals that discussed women's social problems. The studies also point to historical evidence of the active participation and subsequent suppression of female intellectuals. They argue that imposed disruptions, such as the Unveiling Decree, which were the result of secularism and

modernization, led to emerging Islamist forms of social recognition and agency. In other words, parallel to "modern technologies of the self," we observe reinvented Islamic traditionalism shaping the new Islamist feminine disposition (Mahmood 2005). Muslim women's agency, in this context, poses a challenge to Western secularism as women seek the roots that are relevant to their identity – their cultural instrument of authenticity (Nökel 2002, 144; Stauth 1999, 28) – at a practical everyday and institutional level. While these approaches are well suited to explain the religious sensibilities and the subjectivity of women, they are less suitable for understanding how individual transformations depended on exchanges in public spaces. In other words, they neglect material and spatial formations which are particularly visible in the Iranian case.

Questions of agency and cultural authenticity matter in elaborating the dialectics of self-formation and institutional power in the historical encounters between secularism and Islam, but they need to be complemented by a broader view on materiality in order to achieve a robust understanding of discursive production itself. One expression of such adjustment lies in trans-corporeal feminist materialism, which emphasizes the material interconnections beween human corporeality and the environment (Alaimo 2008, 238). To overcome the limitations of the previous studies, I will analyze the 1936 Unveiling Decree as the topos of *transparency* of social relations in spatial terms, which contrasts with the *elusiveness* (see Nielsen 2016, 275) of these relations. By 'transparency,' I mean the spatial reordering of society in terms of a general secular comportment assigned to control and modernization. Such measures include the erasure of convoluted urban structures and their replacement with parallel, wide streets of uni-façade counterposed houses that cut through ethnic and religious districts, and measures of surveillance like patrolling the main squares to secure secular spaces. In contrast, 'elusiveness' implies a long-standing obstacle based upon affinities between women's religious sentiments and the way they recreate spaces as sites and means of protection against visibility.

With the emphasis on spatial segmentation as related to the senses between secured secular spaces and protected religious spaces, my approach draws on the 'affective turn,' a concept which has rarely been taken up in historical sociology, though it is echoed in related disciplines such as anthropology, cultural studies, and geography. The 'affective turn' takes its cues from Deleuze's interpretation of Spinoza and his conception of 'affectus.' Affect theories follow Spinoza's notion of the unity of body and mind, and his claim that the Cartesian notion of fully conscious human beings is a myth as the human being remains ignorant of its corporeality. According to Deleuze (1995), affect is an autonomous entity that moves through human bodies but does not necessarily emerge from them. Affect is not simply emotion, nor is it reducible to the affections and perceptions of an individual subject. Instead, affect relies on sensual intensities that traverse the subject (Thrift 2000, 219). As Deleuze puts it:

> Percepts are not perceptions; they are packets of sensations and relations that outlive those who experience them. Affects are not feelings; they are becomings that go beyond those who live through them. (Deleuze 1995, 137)

Yael Navaro-Yashin describes "affective geographies" as an anthropological approach that studies affect and subjectivity in tandem, attending to "the embroilment of inner and outer world… to draw a cartography of the affects of an outer environment and those of interior human selves, as they are interrelated" (Navaro-Yashin 2012, 24). Drawing upon affective geographies, I attempt to break the boundaries and limitations in analysis that would bind the political in its seemingly rationalized institutional and discursive forms. Notably, by focusing on geography and combining inner senses with the environment, Navaro-Yashin productively opens an anthropological imaginary that views "spaces" as broader than the "sites" or "institutions" (Navaro-Yashin 2002, 3) in which politics are being produced. Drawing upon Navaro-Yashin's approach to affective geographies, I raise the classic sociological question regarding the relation between urbanism and secularization, but this time from the affect perspective and in a non-European context.[4]

While within sociological approaches, the relation between urbanism and secularization has been largely defined under the umbrella of narratives of modernity and centered on general categories, such as rational planning, bureaucratized modes of power, industrial production, and consumption; new studies have tried to break the linearity of this relation (Becci and Burchardt, 2013, 5). It is also aptly argued that

> sociological accounts within the orthodox model of secularization [address] these issues regularly at the society level but [pay] only little empirical attention to the study of secularization in actual cities. (ibid., 5)

Affect, as it is applied in this article, encompasses this relation between urbanism and secularization, focusing on the tangible, material aspects.

My focus on affect is not simply an effort to establish the sentiments that arose when the Unveiling Decree was implemented. Rather than studying secularism and sentimental reactions, we need to gain an understanding of spatial segmentation and symbolic divisions that encompass affects within them. Here, the term "secularity" seems to capture a facet of historical experience inaccessible to the study of secularism and sensations. While secularization designates functional differentiation as the subject matter of rational institutionalization on the one hand and the privatization of religion on the other hand, the concept of secularity highlights culturally and symbolically anchored forms and "arrangements of differentiation" between religion and other social spheres

[4] It is important to stress that after Deleuze, the focus on differentiation can be moved away from the classic sociological assumption of its being geared exclusively by intentional rational action and similarly the concept of agency being largely dependent on rational representation.

(Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012, 881). Secularity embraces social conflicts and negotiation processes by all agencies contributing to the momentum of differentiation (ibid., 882). In their definition of secularity, Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt insist on the significant role of affect and meaning. As they write:

> variations across time and space in how the religious-secular divide is understood and justified cannot be reduced to structural and institutional dimensions. Against the tendency to construe this divide mainly in terms of relationships between church and state we suggest that cultural sociology with its insistence on the ineluctable embeddedness of action in the horizons of affect and meaning (Alexander and Smith 2002, 136) can offer new insights in the endurance of variations and the persistency with which they are defended. […] We suggest to conceptualizing secularity *by asking to which societal reference problems the development of different forms of secularity responds and what solution they offer for these problems.* (2012, 880)

In this sense, I am asking how the 1936 decree, which drew a line between 'the veiled' and 'the unveiled,' claimed to recognize women, while introducing a new regime of bodily maintenance that influenced people's everyday material life. This new regime imposed changes that gave daily life new qualities, tempo, and rhythm as well as introducing visual and auditory changes. I am also exploring the encounter between the decree, the people it targeted, and the environmental setting it was imposed on, in terms of which relations it intensified, where it was challenged, and what response it received.

In order to map the material changes in everyday life in terms of spatial segmentation and symbolic divisions of the religious and the secular, I draw upon notions like the urban atmosphere (Böhme 1993), the mobile modalities of architecture (Bourdieu 1970, Foucault 1990, Yaneva 2014), and transformations in the domestic sphere, in their capacities to affect and be affected.

The ideas of atmosphere and affect are entwined (Anderson 2014, 114). 'Atmosphere,' as Böhme puts it, addresses the spatially discharged and quasi-objective feeling that tunes the space (Böhme 1993, 117-8).[5] There is a spatial aspect to the Unveiling Decree, which has remained rather unattended in the scholarly literature. If we consider atmosphere, we can see that part of unveiling involved separating spaces and assigning new characters to them. Of course, the integration of new sound media, electricity and state control over leisure activities marked the tone of the emergent secular atmosphere in post-1936 Iran. At the same time, the Unveiling Decree was accompanied by efforts to remove religious elements from towns: *Muharram* street rituals were restricted, as were the spaces available for religious activities, such as mourning. This contributed to a scenario in which the public practice of religion was punishable.

[5] Compare with Randal Collins on emotional energy (2004, 118-20).

The idea of 'unveiling' was also complemented by numerous urban construction projects that promoted transparent social relations. For Reza Shah, the old style of houses represented backwardness and traditional values such as extended family and associated hierarchies. Building atomized cement apartments generated a sense of individualization. If we consider Bourdieu and Foucault's insights on architecture, the concept of architecture here moves beyond representing or disciplining machinery.

Bourdieu's 1970 study of the Berber house opens with a long footnote on the importance of situating things and activities for analyzing the social relations. He states:

> the postulate that each of the observed phenomena derives its necessity and its meaning from its relation with all the others was the only way of proceeding to a systematic observation. …This postulate is rendered valid by the very results of the research program it establishes: the particular position of the house within the system of magical representations and ritual practices justifies the initial abstraction by means of which the house is taken out of the context of this larger system in order to treat it as a system itself. (1970, 152)

With this statement, Bourdieu brings to the fore a unity between the built environment and subjectivity. For Bourdieu, architecture is a medium of representation and a context of social relations.[6] On a more localized level, Bourdieu shows that we can also develop a new status for architecture in social sciences that articulates habitualized practices as the outcomes of particular locations, neighborhoods, streets, and courtyards (Bourdieu 1977, 89-90).

On a second level, we should note that Foucault (1977) regarded architecture as an instrument of discipline within the framework of the "panoptic prison." Foucault argued that the architectural design of the prison made the prisoner aware that they may be under surveillance at all times, resulting in self-discipline. As such, the prison architecture is productive: through its capacity to observe the prisoner, the panoptic tower's architecture internalizes the institutional power.

Despite taking different stances, both Bourdieu and Foucault acknowledge a relationship between physical requirement and sociocultural interactions. While Bourdieu would regard this relationship as symbolic or neutral,[7] and Foucault would consider it instrumental, both fail to explore the material aspect of architecture or, more precisely, how architecture incorporates an affective differentiation. A materiality-oriented view of architecture attests

---

[6] See, e.g., Lefebvre 1991, Hendon 2007, Meskell 2003, Whitridge 2004.

[7] Following Bourdieu, a trend of studying architecture has developed in the social sciences which focuses on extrapolating structural relations in the social context from the built environment (see, e.g., Austin and Thomas 1990, Johanson et al. 2004, Whitridge 2004). For a critical approach to the application of architectural elements to the social sciences, see Yaneva 2013, Buchli 2013, Bille and Sorenson 2016, 3-9.

> full deployment of material qualities, the unexpected surprises, the technical gesture of the maker, the unforeseen consequences and underestimated properties of materials. (Yaneva 2013, 44)

Considering the new mode of urban architecture in Tehran,[8] modern in outlook and atomized in nature, the architecture in this period should be dealt with as a construction in progress. This architecture 'in progress' illustrates the tension between transparency and elusiveness. It underlines the tension introduced by the more radical elements of the state's 'unveiling' plans, with the construction of smaller houses, home to just the nuclear family, requiring women to leave the family home to meet others contrasting with the old urban architecture, which represented and protected traditional values to the point of "contradiction and disjunction" (Buchli 2013, 6).

Domesticity was a further area affected by spatial changes in the urban environment and influenced by the Unveiling Decree. The new dynamics within houses took women beyond their former framework of domestic work and created new neighborhood networks. It should be noted here that domesticity is a topic area wherein the role of the 'veiled' woman and the use of the 1936 decree to suppress these women has frequently been misrepresented.

3. Methodology

The following considerations are organized around three thematic paths: (1) unveiling, (2) the built urban environment, and (3) domesticity. The article primarily draws on the first wave of modern life-writing in the genre of autobiography in Iran, the many letters and reports related to unveiling, as well as writings about design and landscape found in the works of architectural historians of the Qajar and Pahlavi regime in the late 19th and 20th centuries. Analysis of the spatial dimension in these texts is spurred by anthropological interest in the method of 'sensory ethnography,' which promotes the analysis of people's sensual registers of social interactions (e.g., Howes 2003, Low 2005, Vannini et al. 2012), their physical environments (e.g., Ingold 2010, Buchli 2013, Bille et al. 2014), and memory (Sutton 2001, Irving 2010, see also Pink 2015). With my interest in atmospheres and affects, I approach the spatial analysis of the 1936 decree through the remarks provided in the reports from the municipalities' officials and the descriptions of a changing urban environment in the works of the autobiographers.

In the wake of Reza Shah's modernization of means and forms of urban life, a group of young Western-educated men who had returned to Tehran from

[8] It should be noted that I apply these theories solely to modern houses for the sake of this article. This does not mean that the traditional houses had no influence.

Europe found themselves confronted with the new face of the city. Biased as their narratives are, due to their pro secular-regime position, their high regard for the Pahlavi regime and their employment in the new state's cabinet, their autobiographies involve their observations of walking through Tehran and comparisons with their lived experience in European cities.

The autobiographies, which emerged as a literary genre in the early 20th century, contain details that are of particular interest for the following[9]: (1) discourse on the development of the Unveiling Decree (by Hikmat, the interior minister); (2) observations about infrastructure, urban construction, and planning (by Morteza Moshfiq Kazemi, 1904-1978); and (3) the dynamics of urbanism, rituals, and transformations in the patterns of domestic life (Abdullah Mostowfi, 1877-1950). Also, of relevance to these themes is a perspective from the intellectual circles and female gatherings (by Yahya Dowlatabadi, 1862-1939) and the impact of the urban changes from an outsider's perspective (by Abdulhussein Sanatizade Kermani).

Further to the material of these life-writings, I draw upon dispersed data from various historiographies with depictions of changes in environmental settings, including views, soundscapes, and densities of crowds in different streets, modalities of daily mobility, and spatial segregations of localities. My own observations largely focus on: a) atmospheric descriptions of witnessed changes in urban residential and market areas; b) described affective imprints and sensual reactions to rapid changes in architecture and urban planning and design; c) reactions to rules and new perceptions of order; d) the reformulation of gendered power relations; and e) veiling and unveiling with respect to body and spatial arrangements. I address the very recognizable spheres of affect modulation and spatial transformations that provided new mundane and material notions of what is religious/secular in the daily life of the urban regions.

4. Tehran in a Tense Atmosphere

Today, many historians writing about the implementation of the 1936 Unveiling Decree focus on the violence experienced by veiled women. Regardless of their age and social class, women who remained veiled were arrested, beaten, or had their veils removed in the streets by police and municipal officers. Women were further humiliated by officials confiscating their veils or setting their veils on fire. The violence carried out by officials often led to further assaults by members of the public. However, aggressions against women in Tehran's public spaces were nothing new. In his autobiography, Morteza

[9] On the first wave of modern life-writing in Iran, see Fragner (1979). On how these autobiographies related to historical and social novels, see Jan Rypka (1959).

Moshfiq Kazemi describes a horrifying misogynistic environment. He observed a group of women being lashed in the main square and, in a separate instance, an abducted woman being sexually harassed by a group of men. Moshfiq Kazemi writes: "Kidnapping and harassing women are common experiences for people who live in Tehran" (1958, 139-40). Against a background of violence against women in the early Pahlavi period, he argues that in the post-decree period,

> the shift in dressing and women's emancipation has been fully achieved. No woman is seen in veil anymore. The number of clerics (*moamamin*) has fallen and the bureaucratic system is operating amazingly in all organizations. (ibid., 428)[10]

Removing veiled women from public spaces required urban spaces to be re-mapped and divided with new surveillance measures to ensure veiled women could be identified and denied access. Major streets, markets and main squares were under strict police observation even at night. A growing number of shops put up signs stating that veiled women were banned,[11] and there were even attempts to impose institutional regulations for times and particular zones of cemeteries and shrines that were to be closed to veiled women.[12] Increasing regulation and surveillance resulted in women perceiving new boundaries in their lives.

In addition to open spaces, the banning of social services to veiled women became another facet of regulation. Restaurants, cabs, and coaches were obliged not to admit veiled women (Kashani-Sabet 2011, 157-9), and veiled women were no longer seen walking to the public baths with their bundles as they were denied access there too. Veiling was not only redefined as illegal but also as immoral as veiling now became obligatory for prostitutes[13] who could only operate in a certain city district. If they failed to veil, the dancing halls in which they worked were shut down (see Hekmat 1975, 72; Amin 1999, 362).

Schools were particularly affected by the Unveiling Decree. Some female teachers resigned while girls who were unwilling to abide by the decree were expelled. The political polarization that resulted from the decree stood in strong contrast to the idealized pluralism in schools that had been envisioned after the Constitutional Revolution. The torn chadors left under the benches of veiled girls signaled that they were not welcome among their classmates any longer.

[10] Moshfiq Kazemi and many other intellectuals in Iran supported unveiling, which they regarded as a measure to prevent violence against women and suppression of women (see Moshfiq Kazemi 1985, 315).

[11] Zan-e Ruz magazine, January 8, 1972, No. 353, in Salah's collection of manuscripts 2005, 161.

[12] The Center of Historical and Archive Studies, Central Police of Khorasan, File 7454, July 11, 1936, in Salah's collection of manuscripts 2005, 286.

[13] Iran National Archive, Interior Ministry Files 17224/51561 December 16, 1935, in Salah's collection of manuscripts 2005, 280.

New school uniforms excluded veils and scarves for girls, and teachers were not permitted to cover their heads either. According to Najmabadi:

> Girls were withdrawn from the schools and kept at home. Women teachers who did not want to unveil resigned from their jobs or were dismissed. Girls' schools that had been sites of women's public togetherness, with women acting not only as students and teachers but as citizens, actively shaping 'gendered and patriotic sisterhood' now became sites of division. (2008, 51)[14]

There were also important changes that helped to produce secular soundscapes. Shops and cafés were permitted to broadcast the latest songs by female Iranian singers. They could do so without being mocked by clerics or asked by conservative traders to turn off the music. As Moshfiq Kazemi reported:

> The new music shops in Lalehzar avenue sell the gramophone records in order to attract more customers, the chansons and songs of Qamar al-Moluk Vaziri and Moluk Zarrabi[15] are played in the streets. Not more than a while ago, such loud music would have spurred the abhorrence of the clerics or immediately incited religious conservatives to rage against the prohibited female voice. (1958, 299-300)

While the secular soundscape was growing, public religious processions were forced to retreat into the background. Just three months after the Unveiling Decree, *Muharram* religious processions were treated as disruptions to the acoustic urban environment. Under new rules, mourning crowds were obliged to hold their ceremonies quietly; the sermons and elegiac singing had to be performed soberly while shouting and crying were prohibited and veiled women denied access to the mourning sessions.[16]

Reza Shah's views on public *Muharram* rituals, described by Abdullah Mostowfi in his voluminous autobiography (1962), are illustrative of the contradictions that were inherent in changes in urban atmospheres in this period. Reza Shah himself participated fully in *Muharram* rituals, but found himself at odds with the unrestrained bodily expressions and sounds of the mass rituals. According to Mostowfi, Reza Shah did not reject the ritual but felt repelled by its superficial ceremonialism. Before Reza Shah's rule, *Muharram* rituals had been restricted to the state building (*tekiyeh dowlat*). In the first years of his rule, there was a substantial increase in the number of groups holding religious

[14] Najmabadi claims that the creation of a new boundary between the religious and the secular on the basis of the veil pushed the "modern religious" into an outcast position, there are some doubts about her presumption that "girls and women" were imprisoned and entirely secluded in their homes. It should be noted that the critical feminist historiography, despite being aware of the arbitrariness of the boundary between veiled and unveiled women, maintains the boundary by remaining focused exclusively on the secular unveiled women.

[15] Two female singers of that period.

[16] Iran National Archive, Prim Ministry Files 103013/9692 April 7, 1937, in Kashani-Sabet 2011, 158.

processions, with each district holding its own party. Singers competed with one another in the street and the processions turned into loud shouting. Dense crowds of women formed around the processions. Mostowfi suggested that in these situations it was "annoyingly impossible to control the crowd and calm their noise" (2015, 276), and to open the mourning sessions with a speech.[17] Rules that were introduced placing restrictions on *Muharram* rituals were supposed to accentuate the secular atmosphere surrounding them.

A similar shift towards controlling emotional expression can be seen if we compare Westernized street theater with the traditional mourning play (*tazieh*). During the early 20th century, new street theaters drew large audiences with short, simple stories inspired by the translation of Western dramas. This contributed to the production of secular soundscapes. In contrast to traditional mourning plays (*tazieh)*, the street theater used musical instruments and actors wore everyday clothing. Religious authorities objected to these new facets of theater (see Sanatizade 2015, 135). Women were still excluded from the stage, but men playing female roles now had more extensive parts, were unveiled, attempted to express feminine emotions vocally, and made efforts to represent normal women in everyday life (Sanatizade 2015, 134-7).

The new scenes of unveiled women in the secular atmosphere of Tehran, sitting in cafés and walking in the busy streets, had a wide-reaching influence on social tastes and relations. Sanatizade, who moved to Tehran from the southeastern town of Kerman in the early 1930s, described his first encounters with the educated women of Tehran with astonishment and great enthusiasm. He decided to go against his traditionalist background and propose marriage to a young woman he had met in one of the women's liberation circles. Through the narration of his relationship, the reader learns that (1) it was only the 'properly' trained women from the highest economic strata who were experienced enough to be unveiled due to their travels in Europe (ibid., 240-9). Being unveiled was very expensive, requiring the purchase of a new wardrobe.[18] At the same time, given that they were amateurs in this area, women were not accustomed to or knowledgeable about how to dress unveiled.[19] (2) Despite the fact that women had removed their veils, many men did not accept the presence of women in public. Ultimately, Sanatizade makes a desperate attempt to escape scandal after talking to a woman he did not know (the one he wanted to marry) for "too long" and being "too close" to her. Unable to afford a European wedding dress for his future wife, Sanatizade returned to his hometown with the social stigma of a "seducer." A photograph taken on his way out of Tehran aptly reflects the

[17] On *Muharram* rituals, see Mostowfi 1985, 270-300.
[18] See Salah (2005, 174-6) and Amin 2004.
[19] Sadeghi (2013) has captured the idea of photography and has focused on the unveiled women in different occasions to show the unaccustomed dressing code at odds with their way of life.

changes in men's social tastes. The photograph shows a crowd of women wearing black veils, and Sanatizade asks the cleric sitting next to him how he is supposed to choose the woman of his life (ibid., 254-5)![20]

Image 1: Sanatizade's Picture of Veiled Women ca. 1929, in Mehdi Ganjavi 2015, 255

In summary, there were various layers to how atmosphere was articulated in this period; boundaries were formed and localities divided; regulations were put in place and public sentiments guided. All in all, this aimed in various ways at governing excessive sentiments, reordering the intensity of emotions, and disciplining the expression of public emotions. Certainly, there was always the presence of a monocratic ruler who affirmed his role in everything and interfered in all public moods and sentiments with direct impositions of his mundane aristocratic taste. The regime's fractured interference resulted in an initial wave of affective differentiation, reordering rituals, spaces, bodies, and locations.

5. Urban Architecture and Sites of Resistance

The entanglement of the Unveiling Decree and the new urban design program are not explicitly addressed in the historical record. However, they become evident in the contradictory relationships between citizens' former habits and the architectural orientations of the new generation of Western-educated urban

[20] The answer of the cleric is significant inasmuch as it restricts the problem of unveiling to a matter of urban life and a marker of social strata. He replies: "In no other religion marriage is as easy as in Islam. In the villages women are not covered, you can chat and discuss with them. Marrying urban women is for those who search power and social recognition. Choose a villager and make a temporary marriage with her. If in this period you realized she is the wife you wished for keep her, otherwise let her free after the due date of the marriage" (Sanatizade 2015, 255).

planners and architects. The question that arises is how the urban architectural elements and new sets of materiality introduced in the 1930s and 1940s mediated the decree's implementation through their impact on inhabitants' sensibilities.

Reza Shah's intentions in governing urban designs were teleological, functional, and guided by images of Western metropoles and capitals. Central to this design were wider roads and cement facades. Compared to the multiple dispersed efforts to police and govern women's dress in the 1930s, the Shah's project to give a secular sense to urbanity was conducted in a more systematic fashion. The new urban design was meant to be an aesthetic expression of new secular lifestyles.

Traditionally, cities were comprised of series of courtyards, linked by alleyways and minor paths. As such, people leaving the inner space of a compound, which was generally inhabited by an extended family, did not have to go straight into the street but could instead pass from courtyard to courtyard. Covered walkways and gated passages[21] within colonies of houses offered access to several houses or pavilions. Whereas most of the pavilions were destroyed (this was particularly the case in Isfahan, where pavilions were destroyed by the Qajar viceroy Zel al-Soltan in the late 19th century), the passages remained intact in affluent areas. Importantly, as most of the houses belonging to one colony of houses had more than one door to the surrounding streets, women could move around without being visible to the police. As a result, despite Isfahan having a population of 300,000 women, the city's police guards reported successfully unveiling just 4,000 women (Salah 2005, 195).

Modern concrete buildings that were beginning to be designed for nuclear families, by contrast, were individual domestic units, each of which would be directly connected to the street through a door. Whereas the older design was characterized by multiple layers of domesticity and graded transitions between domestic and public space, the modern city entailed clear boundaries between the private and the public.

In the wake of the unveiling decree, the material layout of the old city and the social relations it embodied facilitated various forms of resistance against police forces tasked with implementing the decree, as it offered a space in which veiled women could continue to move and were shielded from surveillance. The existing infrastructure of the city, including solid walls and large courtyards, hindered the fulfillment of the secularization plans and provided sites of non-conformity to the secular order. The urban infrastructure supported efforts to evade the unveiling attempts, and Reza Shah responded with a policy of transparency, trying to eliminate the architectural barriers to his secularization plans.

[21] Center of Historical and Archive Studies, Exarch letters 418, June 23, 1936, in Salah's collection of manuscripts 2005, 296.

Image 2: Abd el-Qafar Map of Tehran, 1891

Source: Najm al-Doleh, Abd el-Qafar. Abd el-Qafar Map of Tehran. 1891. National Cartographic Center of Iran. Tehran. <www tehranshenasi.com/1395/10/24>.

Reza Shah's ambition to harness the 'architectural power' of the Qajar capital, Tehran, lay in his intense efforts to secularize what might be described as its 'affective dimension.' Qajarid architecture was often religious, with such elements as twelve gates, five wards, 114 towers and large harems in their palaces. From 1932 onwards, Reza Shah's planning decisions signaled his increasing rejection of such architecture. He ordered the destruction of two of the twelve gates, which represented the twelve Shi'ite imams. He also ordered the demolition of the harem in the Golestan Palace, the royal Qajar courthouse, in line with his legal reform to end polygamy. Moshfiq Kazemi, who participated in huge building projects in this period, commented on the pressure from the court to destroy the portals[22] as follows:

[22] Ervand Abrahamian writes: "Reza Shah destroyed much of the old city, including its twelve gates, five wards, tekiyehs and winding alleyways, with the explicit goal of making Tehran an 'up-to-date capital.' He gave the avenues such names as Shah, [...] Pahlavi [...] He eliminated gardens named after such aristocrats as Sepahsalar and Farmanfarma. [...] He licensed five cinemas in northern Tehran [...] Around these cinemas developed a new middle-class lifestyle with modern cafés, boutiques, theaters, restaurants, and bookstores" (2008, 92).

> Malik Feysal, the king of Iraq, was about to visit[23] and all organizations were getting ready to serve him. One order was to destroy the portal of the old Naghareh Khaneh, situated at the entrance of *Ark* and the portal to the Marble Palace such that the courtier's guests could drive up to the Golestan Palace in their cars. Indeed, these were both historical buildings but since the decision was made, actualizing it was inevitable. (1958, 306)

Significantly, the destruction of the Naghareh Khaneh portal had an impact on Tehran's inhabitants' sense of temporality as the portal had been where the kettledrum and horn had been played to announce prayer times and the closing of the gate at midnight.[24] When the portal was destroyed, these religious markers were also eliminated, adding to the production of secular urban space.

From 1936, the remaining city gates were used to closely monitor women's dress. The gates were protected by guards who meticulously scrutinized the material and sizes of women's hats and checked for any form of 'improper' unveiling, e.g., being wrapped in long scarves.[25] Unveiling became the yardstick for broader notions of 'modern dress.' People arriving from the countryside were not permitted to wear nomadic and other kinds of 'ethnic' clothing. To ensure that unveiling controls were effective, police and municipal officers were systematically distributed across the city according to criteria such as population density and levels of resistance. Officers were thus concentrated on the main gates to the cities, major streets, main squares, and markets and would threaten to report or arrest women who did not conform.

As a result of the Street Widening Act of November 13, 1933,[26] the front-yards of houses were made narrower in order to create more space for roads and the old-style entrances were replaced with doors that could be locked (Karimi 2013, 51f). This made it more difficult for veiled women to evade guards patrolling the neighborhood. At the same time, new electric street lamps broke the darkness of the nights that had afforded veiled women some level of invisibility. As Sanatizade observed:

> It was already one hour after the sunset when we passed Shah Abdolazim Gate to enter Tehran. The first thing that attracted me was the electric lamps giving light to the streets in the darkness of night, I had never seen them before. (1967, 111)

---

[23] This visit took place on May 6, 1932.

[24] See Abdullah Mostowfi, Vol. 1, 272, and Vol. 2, 43. Also Najmi (1969, 272).

[25] The uncanny appearance of some women wrapping themselves in long scarves, bed sheets, and large hats was a subject of dispute among women and the guards. For more on the guards' reports, see: Center of Historical and Archive Studies, Exarch of Khorasan letters 291, June 1, 1936 in Salah's collection of manuscripts 2005, 285-6.

[26] E. Ehlers and W. Floor, *Urban Changes in Iran 1920-1941* (Iranian Studies 26, 3-4 (1993): 252-75) as referenced in Karimi 2013, 52.

Shrines and cemeteries, and the areas surrounding them, provide a good example of the contradictory implementation of the Unveiling Decree.[27] Although the state did not oblige women to unveil during their pilgrimage to the shrines and funerals, guards placed at gates of the shrines and cemeteries set restrictions. In a deed to the interior ministry from July 5, 1936, it is reported that "the guards have no right to interfere within the sacred realm of the shrine. [However,] I suppose 100 men are enough to protect the surrounding" (Salah 2005, 152).

Image 3: Tehran 1976 (last years of Pahlavi Regime)



Source: Guide to Tehran Historical Maps. Tehran-e Markazi Map. 1976. Archive of Tehran. <www.tehrandoc.blogfa.com/category/1>.

The ultimate goal of Reza Shah's Unveiling Decree was to homogenize the faces of the cities by eradicating signs of tribal affiliation, religious belief, and sectarian membership. Instead, economic class alone was to be considered a distinguishing factor (Abrahamian 2008, 92).[28] This involved the destruction of

[27] For example, the muncipal officers in Khorasan were in charge of stopping veiled women at the entrance of the cemetery and forbidding them from entering Bagh-e Mazar; the Iran National Archive, Interior Ministry Files 541/5, June 20, 1936 in Salah's collection of manuscripts 2005, 284.

[28] See Wohrab-Sahr, Burchardt for the discussion about various forms of secularity and their guiding ideas. On the "life-world related" category of decentralized secularity, they introduce "balancing and accommodating diversity" as a function of secularity (2012, 890).

architectural barriers and the building of a transparent city that left no place to hide.

Tekyeh Dowlat, a place of rituals and religious processions, particularly used by Sufi orders, was certainly the most significant of the sites that were destroyed. Built in accordance with Western theater saloons in late 19th century, *tekyeh Dowlat* was the focal point of *Muharram* rituals under the Qajars. During the two months of *Muharram* and *Safar*, several mourning sessions, religious sermons, and mourning plays (*tazieh)* were performed in it. Towards the end of the Qajar Dynasty, the place received less attention by the state, which was in charge of holding the annual ceremony with fervid mourners, flamboyant processions, *tazieh* groups, and extravagant tables (Mostowfi 2015, 290-96). The first definite change occurred when the site hosted the exhibition of domestic industry and products. Together with many other *tekyehs* that closed with the promulgation of an act against mourning plays in 1933,[29] *tekyeh Dowlat* lost its importance as a public site of religious processions and was later turned into a bank by the second Pahlavi Shah.

Between 1936 and 1940, efforts to demolish the existing structures of Tehran and redevelop it into a transparent city extended to residential areas, houses, and facades. The plans accelerated to the extent that Tehran was described as a "flattened ruin, altered by an earthquake."[30]

A report produced by the American embassy in 1940 estimated the number of demolished houses to be between 15,000 to 30,000 (Karimi 2013, 68). Most significantly, these urban reconstructions corresponded to the government's policies for the creation of 'liberated unveiled women':

> Forced unveiling created a liberated Iranian woman and an enlightened housewife who was supposed to live in modern houses. There were similarities between the ways in which the press portrayed the Iranian vis-à-vis the 'new' Iranian house. Both were subject to a cult of rationalization. (Karimi 2013, 59)[31]

What Karimi calls the "cult of rationalization" within urban design was supposed to produce a sense of secular urbanism. Rather than achieving this, many buildings were changed only superficially, with altered facades, or left incomplete. The half-built buildings had puzzling effects on the inhabitants of Tehran. The buildings neither succeeded in representing the imagined secular ideal of urban design, nor did they serve to encourage people to network on a professional level.

---

[29] See Goljan/Afshar-Zand (2014, 116-118) and Aghaie (2004).

[30] U.S. State Department Archives, Engert, dispatch 1830, "Change in the City of Tehran," 891.101/3, May 10, 1940, Tehran, as referenced in Karimi 2013, 68.

[31] As Pamela Karimi explains in her study on the history of urban architecture from the 19th century onwards, the simplicity of architecture in the 1940s, distancing from old styles and historical motifs, reflected an open form of urban interaction connected to the idea of "liberated" and "unveiled" women.

Image 4: Tekyeh Dowlat 1890s



Image 5: Tekyeh Dowlat in 1925 Exhibition for Domestic Industries (Sanatizade 2015, 211)



Source: Institute for Iranian Contemporary Historical Studies. Female Spectators at Tekyeh Dowlat. 1893. <www.iichs.org/index.asp?id=2009&doc_cat=1>.

In his travel diary, a foreign visitor described 1940s Tehran as "Holly-woodesque,"[32] noting that the facades "seemed to have no backs at all and they ended suddenly in space as if they were a part of an unfinished set which would be never used in film-land" (Grigor 2009, 132).

[32] Compare with the concept of arabesque and dream-kitsch in Walter Benjamin.

6. Domesticity

Changes in the construction of houses in this period reflect the ties between the Unveiling Decree and changes in domesticity. The construction of houses is one tangible area in which the implementation of secular ideas was negotiated and challenged. Changes in regimes of domesticity are crucial to understanding the radical reconstruction of the city within a period of less than 20 years.

Traditional homes had a unified indoor space shared by extended families and their servants; they also had a yard in front of and behind the house. These were replaced by modern roadside buildings containing apartments that housed nuclear families. Rooms in the new apartments had specified functions, and the buildings were situated opposite one another, allowing views into neighboring apartments. The alterations in the architectural style of people's homes instigated far-reaching changes of perspectives and attitudes among the people experiencing these new living conditions.

The year 1935 marked the opening of the first cement factory close to Tehran. This would refashion the face of the city (Karimi, 2013, 61). From the beginning, the use of cement was limited to "skillful architects"[33] leading to a monopoly of state-employed, Western-educated architects who did not follow inherited models with houses centered around the yard and the main sources of water. Instead, rooms were differentiated according to their functions. As a new material element, cement realized the division of rooms into separate spaces for sleeping, dining, and cooking, which was at odds with the former embracing of all these functions in one unified space shared by extended families.[34] Kitchens moved from the backyards into the confined space of the apartment and the toilets and bathrooms from their collective and public use to that of nuclear family members. These kitchens provided new forms of privacy and autonomy for women. Religious families started to integrate private bathing facilities into their courtyards in order to circumvent the restriction on veiled women entering the public baths[35]. This perpetuated ideas of hygiene, which had been intro-

[33] The term was used to describe those who had been trained to use cement, unlike self-trained builders who were unfamiliar with the use of new construction materials (Karimi 2013, 62).

[34] Karimi describes the traditional houses as being based upon "temporal consideration," such that the condition of sleeping side-by-side on the floor allowed sexual relation between the couples while the same carpet was covered with another piece of cloth for dining (ibid., 29).

[35] A manuscript related to Khorasan states that it is the municipality's responsibility to watch out for veiled women, refuse them entry to public baths, and report them. It is also mentioned that, for more security, female spies are needed in women's public baths to search their clothes and investigate whether they were breaking the law (Iran National Archive, Interior Ministry Files 541, June 20, 1936 in Salah's collection of manuscripts 2005, 283). For more information about hygiene education for women, see Kashani-Sabet (2006, 1-29).

duced two decades before the decree. In general, the construction of baths inside the walls of the houses engendered a new sense of the care of the self among middle-class urban families.

The cement revolution pushed the problem of elusiveness to a new level for two basic reasons. First, given the fragile nature of formal administrative systems, large numbers of houses were built using informal imitations of the blueprints of skillful architects. Second, getting access to cement for personal building projects was rare, as cement production was not sufficient for the major construction plans for bridges, railways, and houses. This resulted in half-built homes and allowed for individual tastes regarding the final look of the building and the interactions between its inhabitants. In one instance, architects deliberated over the position and sizes of windows in a new home for over a decade in efforts to establish some level of 'invisibility' and 'freedom' of action inside the house. The length of these discussions about windows highlights the cultural significance of the conflict between transparency and elusiveness during the 'cement revolution.'

To further build the image of the 'unveiled' woman, technology such as washing machines, ovens, and vacuum cleaners arrived in Iranian homes,[36] to create a technically adept individual, standing with a straight back and an apron with the cooking pot on the stove. Such images of 'the mothers of the nation,' depicting women in well-equipped kitchens or at work, would be printed in the women's magazines of the 1960s, long after the Unveiling Decree had been rescinded.[37]

At roughly the same time as the cement factory opened, the notion of 'secularization from the inside' was promoted through the popularization of new kinds of parties. While such parties had already been part of the social and cultural lives of private associations and intellectuals, they were now adopted by state employees who were ordered to attend such parties with their wives on a regular basis.[38] Many writers have described these parties as the official staging of the 'unveiling.' Unlike the discussions in intellectual circles, conversations in these parties would take place between women and couples and would focus on domestic issues such as dressing and appearance in home and public. In order to participate in discourse on domesticity, upper middle-class women who presumably occupied the frontiers of unveiling had to familiarize them-

[36] These 'dream' materials of urban domestic life were imported for the first time by American companies in the 1950s. Karimi writes, "American companies such as General Electric and the York Corporation introduced cooler chests, ovens, washing machines and shiny utensils into Iranian kitchens" (2013, 2). On page 95 of her book, there is a picture of a woman squatting in a corner of the yard cooking on a brick-made oven with coals while knitting her veil on the two edges behind the neck.

[37] See, for example, Kashani-Sabet 2011, 200-5 and Karimi 2013, 84-120.

[38] For the state-initiated parties, see *Tajadod* Newspaper, January 15, 1936, no. 1807 and 1809, in Salah's collection of manuscripts 2005, 172-6.

selves with new dressing styles. More importantly, the order of interactions at these parties signaled that professional criteria outweighed familial relations among the participants in significance. Whereas the quasi-intellectual circles of the new generation of Western-educated young officials welcomed the idea of the parties, other employees and high-ranking older generations participated because they feared the discrimination or stigmatization that could result from their absence.[39]

This shift, whereby men would spend more and more time in professional networks led to changes in the domestic order, shaped by the consumerism of women seeking the correct 'look' for the parties. The lavish parties influenced marital life making women responsible for their 'unveiled' appearance while the husbands of non-abiding women were threatened with suspension from their government positions.

Moreover, the changes to veiled women's mobility changed family life as well. New divisions of housework, networks, and material substitutions emerged in these houses. According to current feminist criticism, the immediate result was the increasing patriarchal power of men who carried out additional tasks like daily shopping that had been formerly undertaken by women.[40] Furthermore, women had to surrender a range of their former outdoor activities to men's presence or interference. Deciding about the schooling of younger girls, accompanying and restricting visits to relatives and ancestors in the cemeteries illustrate the conjoining of the state and male power within the home.

7. Conclusion

Complementing the feminist critique of the gendered power in secularization processes, this article drew on the dialectics of institutions and self-formation on the one hand, and the anthropology of space and habitus (Bourdieu, Foucault) on the other hand. I showed how veiling and unveiling became active forces in the reordering of society, introducing new spatial boundaries between religion and the secular.

From this perspective, the differentiation between 'the veiled' and 'the unveiled' was not limited to bodily regimes, but spilled into the realms of every-

[39] The punishments for the employees who did not participate regularly in these parties without testified excuse were varied. Sometimes the person was expelled and in other cases his income was cut or he had to replace his absence by going to the mosque in the company of his unveiled wife. See Iran National Library, Interior Ministry Files 3637, circular 13011, December 21, 1937, as referenced in Salah, 177.

[40] Hoodfar writes on this point, "women became even more dependent on men since they had to ask for men's collaboration in order to perform activities they had previously performed independently" (1997, 247-79).

day material urban life, linking tensions between secularity and religion to the demand to homogenize urban space, citizenship, and public participation.

In this sense, secular transparent social relations impinged upon and were realized by city design, architecture, and the power of atmospheres. This implies that secularity is not always about functional differentiations and rational solutions. Instead, I suggest that secularization implies an *affective* dimension in that it ties secular and religious spaces to particular kinds of affect. Street planning, new materials, and topographies led to largely new affective perceptions, sensibilities, and re-assemblages regarding where to go in the new arena of urban spaces, with whom to affiliate, and which functions to exercise. The elusiveness of the buildings, balancing the 'visible' and 'the invisible' of the social life, against the scope of building transparent social relations signaled the significant role played by local initiatives coordinated independently of central state power, in reordering spaces and segmenting them. The relation between affect and secularity corresponds to the networks of multiple relations between things, localities and inhabitants and therefore lacks a fixed center, an anchorage to a full-fledged horizon of secularization. Instead of being an emerging, nationally resonant cultural form, secularity acquired its effectiveness in particular locales through spatial politics: through urban rejuvenation, police violence, consumerism, and new social behavior within intellectual circles on the one hand, and extended families in traditional houses who lived in neighborhood networks on the other.

That said, I would argue that functional differentiation and the affective dimension of secularity are actually interrelated and complementary. More research is needed to advance the sociological understanding of materializations of secularity in connection to city gestalt.

References

Abrahamian, Ervand. 2008. *The History of Modern Iran*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Afary, Janet. 2009. *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran*. Cambridge University Press.

Aghaie, Kamran S. 2004. *The Martyrs of Karbala: Shia Symbols and Rituals in Moderm Iran*. University of Washington Press.

Ahmadzadeh, Mohamad A. 2016. Arzyabi va naghde mas'aleye kashf-e hijab az manzar-e ghodrat va siasat-e farhangi 1305-1320 (A Critical Study of the Unveiling, Power and Cultural Politics Approach 1926-1941). *Jamee-pajuhi Farhangi Humanities and Cultural Studies Research Center* 6 (1): 1-26.

Alaimo, Stacy. 2008. Trans-Corporeal Feminisms and the Ethical Space of Nature. In *Material Feminisms*, ed. Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman, 237-62. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Amin, Camron M. 1999. Propaganda and Remembrance: Gender, Education and the Women's Awakening of 1936. *Iranian Studies* 32 (3): 351-86.

Amin, Camron M. 2004. Importing 'Beauty Culture' into Iran in the 1920's and 1930's: Mass Marketing Individualism in an Age of Anti-Imperialist Sacrifice. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 24 (1): 18-35.

Anderson, Ben. 2014. *Encountering Affect: Capacities, Apparatuses, Conditions*. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.

Becci, Irene, and Marian Burchardt. 2013. Religion Takes place: Producing Urban Locality. In *Topographies of Faith: Religion in Urban Space*, ed. Irene Becci, Marian Burchardt and Jose Casanova, 1-25. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

Benjamin, Walter. 2004. Dream Kitsch. In *Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings: 1927-1930*, transl. Rodney Livingstone, ed. Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland and Gary Smith, 3-16. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press

Bille, Mikkel, and Tim Flohr Sorensen. 2016. In to the Fog of Architecture. In *Elements of Architecture: Assembling Archaeology, Atmosphere and the Performance of Building Space*, ed. Mikkel Bille and Tim Flohr Sorensen, 1-30. Oxon and New York: Routledge.

Böhme, Gernot. 1993. Atmosphere as the Fundamental Concept of a New Aesthetics. *Thesis Eleven* 36: 113-26.

Buchli, Victor. 2013. *An Anthropology of Architecture*. London: Bloomsbury.

Chehabi, Houshang. 2003. The Banning of the Veil and its Consequences. In *The making of modern Iran: State and Society under Reza Shah (1921-1941)*, ed. Stephanie Cronin, 193-205. London: Routledge.

Cinar, Alev. 2005. *Modernity, Islam and Secularism in Turkey*. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.

Collins, Randal. 2004. *Interaction Ritual Chain*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Deleuze, Gill. 1995. *Negotiations: 1972-1990*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Dowlatabadi, Yahya. 1952. *Hayat-e Yahya* (Yahya's Life). Tehran: Ibni-Sina

Ettehadieh, Mansoureh. 2004. The Origins and Developments of the Women's Movement in Iran 1906-1941. In *Women in Iran. From 1800 to the Islamic Republic*, ed. Guity Nashat and Lois Beck, 85-106. Urbana & Chicago, University of Illinois Press

Fragner, Bert. 1979. Persische *Memorienliteratur als Quelle zur neueren Geschichte Irans*. Wiesbaden: Frantz Steiner Verlag.

Göle, Nilüfer. 1996. *The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling*. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press.

Goljan, Mehdi, and Sepideh Afshar-Zand. 2014. Tekyeh doalat va marasem-e mazhabi-e An (Tekyeh Dowlat and its Religious Fests*). Tehran University's Historical Researches Journal* 6 (1): 105-21.

Grigor, Talinn. 2009. *Building Iran: Modernism, Architecture and National Heritage under the Pahlavi Monarchs*. New York: Priscope Publication Ltd.

Hikmat, Ali A. 1975. *Si khatirih az asre farkhondeye Pahlavi* (Thirty Stories from Pahlavi Time). sine loco.

Hoodfar, Homa. 1997. The Veil in Their Minds and on Our Heads: Veiling Practice and Muslim Women. In *The Politics of Culture in the Shadow of Capital*, ed. Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd, 247-79. New York: Duke University Press.

Karimi, Pamela. 2013. *Domesticity and Consumer Culture in Iran: Interior Revolution of a Modern Era*. London: Rutledge.

Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh. 2006. The Politics of Reproduction: Maternalism and Women's Hygiene in Iran 1896-1941. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 38: 1-29.
Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh. 2011. *Conceiving Citizens: Women and the Politics of Motherhood in Iran*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mahdavi, Shirin. 2003. Reza Shah Pahlavi and Women: A Re-evaluation. In *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Reza Shah 1921-1941*, ed. Stephanie Cronin, 181-93. London: Routledge.
Mahmood, Saba. 2005. *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Moshfiq Kazemi, Morteza. 1985. *Ruzegar va andishe-ha* (Time and Thoughts). Tehran: Ibni-Sina.
Mostowfi, Abdullah. 2015. *Sharhi zendegani man: Tarikhi ejtemaei va edari doare-ye Qajar* (My Lifestory: The Social and Bureaucratic History of Qajars). Tehran: Hermes Publication.
Najmabadi, Afsaneh. 2008. Unveiling Feminism. In *Secularisms*, ed. Janet Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini, 39-57. New York: Duke University Press.
Najmabadi, Afsaneh. 2007. Authority and Agency: Revisiting Women's Activism during Reza Shah Period. In *The State and the Subaltern: Modernization, Society and the State in Turkey and Iran*, ed. Touraj Atabaki, 159-77. New York: I B Turis in association with International Institute of Social History Amsterdam.
Najmi, Naser. 1969. *Dar al-khilafe-ie Tehran* (Tehran House of Calif). Tehran: Amir-Kabir.
Navaro-Yashin, Yael. 2002. *Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Navaro-Yashin, Yael. 2012. *Make-Believe Spaces: Affective Geography in a Postwar Polity*. New York: Duke University Press.
Nielsen, Morten. 2016. Into Architecture: House-Building and Acentered Personhood in Maputo, Mozambique. In *Elements of Architecture: Assembling Archaeology, Atmosphere and the Performance of Building Space*, ed. Mikkel Bille and Tim Flohr Sorensen, 273-87. Oxon and New York: Routledge.
Nökel, Sigrid. 2002. *Die Töchter der Gastarbeiter und der Islam: Zur Soziologie alltagsweltlicher Anerkennungspolitiken*. Bielefeld: Transcript.
Paidar, Parvin. 1995. *Women and Political Process in Twentieth Century Iran*. Cambridge University Press.
Pink, Sara. 2015. *Doing Sensory Ethnography*. London: Sage Publication.
Rostam-Kolayi Jasmin. 2003. *Expanding Agendas for the New Iranian Woman: Family Law, Work, and Unveiling*. London: Routledge, 2003
Rostam-Kolayi, Jasmin, and Afshin Matin-Asgari. 2014. Unveiling Ambiguities: Revisiting 1930s Iran's Kashf-I Hijab Campaign. In *Anti-veiling Campaigns in the Muslim World: Gender, Modernism and the Politics of dress*, ed. Stephan Cronin, 121-40, London, New York: Routledge.
Rypka, Jan. 1959. *Iranische Literaturgeschichte*. Leipzig: Veb Otto Harrasowitz.
Sadeghi, Fatima. 2013. *Kashf-I Hijab: Bazkhani-e Yek Modakhele-ye Modern* (Unveiling: Rereading of a modern interference). Tehran: Nigahe Moaser.
Salah, Mehdi. 2005. *Kashf-e Hijab: Zamineha, payamadha va vakoneshha* (Unveiling: Context, Consequences and Reactions: Manuscript Collection). Tehran: Moassese-ie Motaleat va Pajouhesh-e Siasi

Sanatizade, Abdulhussein. 2015. *Ruzigari ke gozasht* (The Gone Time) ed. Mehdi Ganjavi and Mehrnaz Mansuri. Gilan Publishing House.
Stauth, Georg. 1999. *Authentizität und kulturelle Globalisierung: Paradoxien kulturübergreifender Gesellschaft*. Bielefeld: Transcript.
Thrift, Nigel. 2000. Afterword. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 18: 213-55.
Wohlrab-Sahr, Monika, and Marian Burchardt. 2012. Multiple Secularities: Toward a Cultural Sociology of Secular Modernities. *Comparative Sociology* 11: 875-909.
Yaneva, Albena. 2013. *Mapping Controversies in Architecture*. Surrey: Ashgate.

Historical Social Research
Historische Sozialforschung

All articles published in HSR Special Issue 44 (2019) 3:
Islamicate Secularities in Past and Present.

Markus Dressler, Armando Salvatore & Monika Wohlrab-Sahr
Islamicate Secularities: New Perspectives on a Contested Concept.
doi: 10.12759/hsr.44.2019.3.7-34

Armando Salvatore
Secularity through a 'Soft Distinction' in the Islamic Ecumene? Adab as a Counterpoint to Shari'a.
doi: 10.12759/hsr.44.2019.3.35-51

Neguin Yavari
The Political Regard in Medieval Islamic Thought.
doi: 10.12759/hsr.44.2019.3.52-73

Florian Zemmin
Validating Secularity in Islam: The Sociological Perspective of the Muslim Intellectual Rafiq al-'Azm (1865-1925).
doi: 10.12759/hsr.44.2019.3.74-100

Samuli Schielke
Is Prose Poetry a Conspiracy Against the Noble Qur'an? Poetics, Humans, and God in Contemporary Egypt.
doi: 10.12759/hsr.44.2019.3.101-126

Katerina Dalacoura
"Islamic Civilization" as an Aspect of Secularization in Turkish Islamic Thought.
doi: 10.12759/hsr.44.2019.3.127-149

Mohammad Magout
Transnationalizing Multiple Secularities: A Comparative Study of the Global Ismaʿili Community.
doi: 10.12759/hsr.44.2019.3.150-179

Sana Chavoshian
Secular Atmospheres: Unveiling and Urban Space in Early 20th Century Iran.
doi: 10.12759/hsr.44.2019.3.180-205

Brannon D. Ingram
A 'Modern' Madrasa: Deoband and Colonial Secularity.
doi: 10.12759/hsr.44.2019.3.206-225

Yee Lak Elliot Lee
Muslims as "Hui" in Late Imperial and Republican China. A Historical Reconsideration of Social Differentiation and Identity Construction.
doi: 10.12759/hsr.44.2019.3.226-263

Martin Ramstedt
Politics of Taxonomy in Postcolonial Indonesia: Ethnic Traditions between Religionisation and Secularisation.
doi: 10.12759/hsr.44.2019.3.264-289